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Abstract: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is an error 
reporting and diagnostic utility and it is considered as a part of 
Internet Protocol (IP) suite. Although this protocol is very 
important for ensuring correct data distribution, it can be exploited 
by malicious users for conducting different Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks. Due to the broadcast nature of wireless communication, 
exploitation of this kind of attack is even easier. By sending bogus 
ICMP redirect packets, a malicious user can either disrupt or 
intercept communication from a wireless access point. 
In this paper, we present our approach to simulate the ICMP 
Ping Flood Attack, and to analyze the effects of this attack on 
wireless networks using OPNET Modeler. We propose several 
countermeasures against this type of attack. Simulation results 
regarding the effects of link failure recovery mechanism against this 
type of attack are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
ICMP is a part of the TCP/IP suite. This protocol handles 
error and control messages. More specific, routers and hosts 
use ICMP to send reports of problems about datagrams, back 
to the original source that sent the datagram [1][2]. ICMP 
messages are encapsulated and sent within IP datagrams. 
 When the message is generated and error occurred, the 
original IP header is encapsulated with the appropriate ICMP 
message and these two pieces are encapsulated within a new 
IP header in order to be returned as an error report to the 
ending device. As it can be seen from Figure 1, there are 
several types of the ICMP messages depending on what the 
ICMP message is reporting.  
 One of the best known examples of ICMP in practice is 
the ping utility. It uses ICMP to check remote hosts for 
responsiveness and examine overall round-trip time of the 
probe messages. 
 The regular ping operation relies on ECHO_REQUEST 
and ECHO_REPLY ICMP messages, but it may respond to 
ICMP messages other than ECHO_REPLY when 
appropriate. 
 It is more than obvious that ICMP messages are very 
useful, especially when an error occurs in the network. 
Unfortunately, malicious users have found a way to turn a 
good network tool into an attack. The most common types of 
ICMP attacks are:   
 ICMP Ping Flood Attack: This attack is based on sending 
huge number of ping packets, usually using “ping” command 
from unix-like host. In this way attacked system can not 
respond to legitimate traffic.   
 ICMP Smurf Attack: This type of attack floods the victim 
machine with spoofed ping packets. All these modified 
packets contain a spoofed IP address of the target victim. 
This cause broadcast of the misinformation to all hosts in the 
local network. All of these hosts now respond with a reply to 
the target system, which is then saturated with those replies. 
If there are many hosts in used networks, victim will be 
effectively spoofed by a large amount of traffic. 
 Ping of Death: An attacker sends to the victim an ICMP 
echo request packet that is larger than the maximum IP 
packet size of 65.536 bytes. Since the received ICMP echo 
request packet is larger than the normal IP packet size, it 
must be fragmented. A consequence of this is that the victim 
can not reassemble the packets, so the OS crashes or reboots. 
 ICMP Nuke Attack: In this type of attack nukes send to the 
victim an ICMP packet with destination unreachable type 3 
messages. The result of this attack is that target system 
breaks communications with existing connections [4]. 
 In this paper we implement simulation framework for 
WLAN using OPNET. We quantify the effect of ICMP Ping 
Flood Attack on WLAN parameters, thereat using different 
kind of security schemes and protocols we demonstrate their 
existing vulnerabilities. 
 Following this introduction, the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 discusses some research on ICMP Ping 
Flood Attack in 802.11 networks. In Section 3, we are giving 
brief overview about ICMP Ping Flood Attack. Next, our 
experimental results are summarized in Section 4. In Section 
5 several methods to mitigate DoS effects are discussed, with 
special reference to the failure recovery mechanism. Finally, 
in Section 6 we conclude our results and provide some 
directions for future work. 
2. Related work 
 
Wireless networks are very susceptible to DoS attacks. ICMP 
Ping Flood attack is one of the simplest and most used DoS 
attacks. Many researchers have already discovered numerous 
strategies for mitigating this type of DoS attack. In this 
section, we summarize some of their findings and proposed 
defense mechanisms. 
 The authors in [3] embedded an ICMP processing module 
in the Network Processor (NP) - based firewall according to 
the characteristics of processing packets flow in IXP2XXX 
NP and the ICMP protocol layer. They carried out their 
simulation on development environment WORKBENCH. 
Their results show that the optimized method proposed in 
their paper can simplify the process flow and improve the 
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ICMP processing efficiency. This can be valuable reference 
for other abnormal packets processing methods in NP based 
firewalls and common ICMP prevention schemes. 
 In [5] is analyzed and proved that window based 
restriction scheme will remove the attack productivity region 
from the ICMP traffic and will promote only genuine traffic. 
This will help to neutralize the flooding attacks. 
 They identified the threshold to signify the attack traffic. If 
the window is opened beyond the threshold it will generate 
traffic beyond the tolerable rate. This traffic source which 
generates beyond identified threshold rate can be blocked for 
a while which will create more IP space for ICMP source. 
 Interesting approaches against several attacks caused by 
ICMP messages are presented in [6]. The number of 
mitigation techniques that help to eliminate or mitigate the 
impact of the ICMP attacks against TCP is described. These 
several techniques can be implemented together to increase 
the protection against these attacks. 
 Proposed techniques amongst many others are: TCP 
Sequence Number Checking, Port Randomization and 
Filtering ICMP Error Messages Based on the ICMP Payload.  
 Excellent practical example about the efficiency of the 
ICMP Ping Flood Attack is shown in [7]. ICMP Ping Flood 
Attack across a range of IP addresses during a certain period 
of time has been observed. Several conclusions are drawn 
based on their experimental obtained results. First, the 
attacker obstruct the probe responses of the access point to 
the clients who were using probe requests to search access 
points. As a result, responses from the access point in the 
wireless network were essentially jammed during heavy 
utilization. Control and management packets of the access 
point are also lost or delayed. This is the reason for 
contribution of the overall network congestion. 
In [8] the authors are taking in consideration the fact that 
security mechanism for one layer cannot be used as 
protection mechanism for the other layers. Hence, they are 
discussing the importance of cross layer security mechanisms 
and routing protocols for multi-hop wireless networks by 
critical comparison. The reason of doing this is to protect 
multi-hop wireless networks from passive, active and denial 
of service attacks, including the flooding attack. 
 In [9] new so called Real-time cross-layer flood 
detection and attack trace-back mechanism (RCFDAT) is 
proposed. Using this mechanism the authors aim to construct 
a large-scale multilayer flood detection approach with low 
computational complexity, high accuracy, and low false-
alarm rate. To test the accuracy of the proposed mechanism 
the theoretical fundamentals have been checked with the help 
of simulations. RCFDAT mechanism is observing the traffic 
flow variations. The reason for this is that this sharp increase 
in traffic flow is the first sign for flooding attack. 
 In [10] this type of DoS attack is presented in relatively 
easy way to understand. The author is giving two solutions 
against becoming a victim of this type of attack. First 
presented solution is filtering of the incoming echo request 
packets. The second solution involves using of netfilter and 
its "limit" module. 
Taking in consideration flooding attack against Wireless 
Mesh Networks, the authors of [11] proposed a mutual 
cooperation mechanism between the backbone multi-hop APs 
and serving gateway. The reason for this is to detect and 
prevent the possibility of cloned AP. Using this mechanism 
the large scale exploration of WMN is eliminated. 
3. ICMP Ping Flood Attack Background 
 
As we already explained, the original ICMP messages are 
encapsulated and sent within IP datagrams. An ICMP packet 
is composed of ICMP header and ICMP payload (See Figure 
1). The type and format of the ICMP packet are indicated in 
the type field in ICMP header [3]. 
 One of the most used ICMP messages is ping command. 
This command is usually used to detect network or host 
communication failures and troubleshoot common TCP/IP 
connectivity problems. However, ping command can also be 
used to cause severe consequences on wireless network.  
 
 
Figure 1. ICMP Message Encapsulation 
 
Figure 2.  ICMP Ping Flood Attack 
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Figure 3.  ICMP Ping Flood Attack through DOS 
 
 The attack caused using ping command is known as ICMP 
Ping Flood Attack, or simply Ping Flood Attack (Figures 2 
and 3). ICMP Ping Flood attack is a simple DoS attack where 
the attacker continuously sends a large amount of ICMP 
Echo Request (Ping) packets to the victim machine and 
saturates the network with traffic. 
 The response to each of these requests limits the amount of 
available system resources for other processes. The 
continuing requests and replies can be a reason for slowing 
the network and causing the legitimate traffic to continue at a 
significantly reduced speed or, in extreme cases, to be 
disconnected. A Ping Flood attack can effectively disable the 
network connectivity.  
4. Simulation results and analysis  
 
Our work conducted regarding presentation of the effects of 
ICMP Ping Flood attack is based on OPNET Modeler. There 
are several reasons why we are using this simulation tool for 
our research. OPNET provides a Graphical User Interface 
(GUI) which allows realistic networks simulation, and has a 
performance data collection and display module. Moreover, 
it has been extensively used and there is wide confidence in 
the validity of the results it produces.  
Our project contains a wireless network of three subnets, 
each representing a floor of a building. The third floor is the 
location of the network's two servers and a switch that 
connects the three floors to the outside world. 
The access point (wireless router) is placed at second floor 
and eight workstations are evenly spread out among first and 
second floor. The access point is connected to servers 
through a switch. 
 In our paper we are going to consider four different 
scenarios. 
 The first scenario is when the wireless network, or in our 
case, the wireless access point (router) is not attacked (no 
Attack). The second scenario is when the same network is 
attacked by one malicious node with ping packet size of 256 
bytes (Attack 1). In the third scenario (Figure 4) attack is 
conducted by three attackers with ping packet size of 256 
bytes (Attack 2). The last scenario is situation when this 
network is attacked by one malicious node, but the size of the 
IP packets sent by this node is 22000 bytes (Attack 3). 
 
Figure 4. 2nd Floor of the building under atttack of three 
malicious nodes (attackers) 
In our simulation we are setting the folowing ping 
parameters:  
• IP Version - Specifies whether IPv4 or IPv6 packets 
should be used. The specified IP version must be 
supported on both the source and destination nodes. 
In all our scenarious this parameter is set to IPv4. 
• Interval - time between successive "ping" packet 
transmissions.  This time for all scenarios when 
attack is conducted is set to 5s.  
• Packet size - "ping" packet size to be sent to the 
specified host. An extra eight bytes of ICMP header 
gets tagged on to this packet before it gets 
encapsulated in an IP datagram. The values of this 
parameter for different scenarious can be seen in 
Table 1.  
• Count - Specifies the number of "ping" packets 
(ICMP ECHO Requests) to be sent. This parameter 
is set to “unlimited”.  
• Timeout - Specifies the time after which the sent 
"ping" requests is considered lost, if no response has 
been received from the specified host. For all 
scenarios when network is under attack this time is 
set to 5s. 
• Record Route - Specifies the option of printing the 
route a given "ping" packet takes to get to the 
specified host. It uses the "record route" option in 
the IP header. This parameter in all scenarios is set 
to “enable”. 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of the three simulated attacks 




1 3 1 
Packet size 
(bytes) 256 256 22000 
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 Because malicious nodes are flooding the wirelees router 
with frequent ICMP Ping packets, the router is unable to 
respond to legitimate users, or in our case, response is 
slower. 
 The number of ICMP ECHO packets in the case when no 
ICMP Flooding attack is performed, is 0. Just for 
comparation, the total number of the ICMP ECHO packets 
when Attack 2 and Attack 3 are conducted is 5,511,030 and 
5,430,732, respectively. 
 The time of simulation is set to 20 minutes. The profile 
start time is set to 100 s and for applications it is 5 s. During 
the initial 105 s no traffic is generated at all. This time can be 
considered as warm up time, which allows queues and other 
simulated parameters to get in a “normal running conditions 
for the system”. 
The average value from the obtained simulation results 
will be presented. As results global statistic of the simulated 
scenario will be shown. These statistics are scoped to the 
simulation as a whole, in contrast to local statistics, which are 
scoped to a particular queue or processor. In other words, 
multiple processes, as well as pipeline stages, all at different 
locations in the model's system, can contribute to the same 
shared statistic. This is done by referring to the statistic by 
name and obtaining a statistic handle.  
 Figure 5 shows global statistic of WLAN Retransmission 
Attempts. With retransmission attempt, as a quantitative 
parameter, the rate of retransmission attempt can be 
determined.  
 This parameter also figures out the number of drops per 
second of the packets which has to be retransmitted. The 
lower retransmission attempt means more reliable link 
connection. In other words, this statistic show the number of 
retransmission attempts during the time the packet is 
successfully transmitted or when it is discarded as a result of 
reaching short or long retry limit..  
 The global statistic of WLAN retransmission attempts is 
presented when no attack is performed and in cases when 1 
or 3 malicious nodes are attacking the simulated wireless 
network with large number of ICMP ECHO Requests, which 
means during attack, AP is permanently disturbed by the 
attacker/s.  
 
Figure 5. Packets retransmission attempts for different 
number of attackers and different ping packet size 
      
Figure 6. WLAN Delay for different number of attackers and 
different ping packet size 
  As it can be seen, increased attackers number is reason 
for increased number of packets retransmission attempts. It is 
the same situation when there is only one attacker, but the 
packet size is increased from 256 to 22000 bytes. It is due to 
the large size of sent ICMP messages from the attacker/s 
which causes AP buffer overflow. Once the router is attacked 
by malicious node problem occurs, the network 
retransmission attempts dramatically increase, which causes 
more collisions.  
 Comparing the results of Attack 2 and Attack 3, it can be 
seen that although at the beginning Attack 2 causes more 
retransmission attempts as the simulation run time increases, 
the effect of these two attacks in the network is becoming 
equal. It is evident that from the 1020th second of the 
simulation run time these two curves are almost equal. 
 Caused collisions are reason for slowing down simulated 
wireless network which can be seen in Figure 6. This figure 
shows global statistic of Wireless LAN Delay of all received 
packets in the network and forwarded to the higher layer as a 
function of simulation run time. 
 This parameter is a metric which determines delay 
between MAC layers. Several phases are included in this 
parameter: dividing the frames into packets, sending them to 
their destination and their assembling at their destination 
MACs. Medium access delay at the source MAC is also 
included within this statistic. From the obtained results for the 
delay it is more than obvious that collisions caused by 
retransmission attempts are reason for this high delay. 
Situation is almost similar as it was previously explained.  
The network performance is reduced due to increased 
number of received packets form the AP. Again, Attack 2 at 
the beginning is more destructive and is causing higher 
WLAN delay compared to the Attack 3. With the simulation 
run time this delay is going down, and delay caused by Attack 
3 is going up. 
 Very important characteristic when WLAN system is 
evaluating is Data Dropped metric. Generally, this 
characteristic shows how WLAN operates when number of 
users or number of packet is increased (scalability issue). 
Figure 7 shows relation between data dropped and simulation 
running time.  
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Figure 7. Data dropped for different number of attackers and 
different ping packet size 
 Wireless AP is the only one that receives all data traffic 
(control or data) from the legitimate users and malicious 
nodes and resends them to their receivers. This AP (in our 
situation wireless router) acts as a central gateway, so if the 
AP fails, the connection between users will be lost. The 
excessive number of packets that is going in or out of AP 
leads to buffer overflow or traffic jam around it. This 
excessive buffer overflow leads data packets to be dropped.  
The previous is showing that the percentage of data dropped 
increasing by increased number of malicious nodes or 
increased number of ping packet size. It is interesting to 
notice that the number of data dropped is drastically higher 
during the Attack 3. This is reasonable because this number is 
directly connected with buffer overflow. It is obvious that the 
case of Attack 3 will have bigger influence on buffer 
overflow, which means higher number of data dropped 
(bit/sec).  
 Figure 8 is showing the average voice jitters which occur 
during voice transmission in the situation when no attack is 
performed and when the wireless network is under the 
described three attacks. 
 
Figure 8. Voice Jitter for different number of attackers and 
different ping packet size 
  
 The jitter values during attacks are dramatically increased. 
Attack on voice transmission is showing the same 
characteristics as in previous described situations. At the 
beginning of simulation, Attack 2 has higher negative 
influence on the network behavior. During the simulation run 
time situation is changed, and from 590th second Attack 3 is 
causing higher voice jitter or higher voice packet delay 
variation. 
  Another QoS parameter which we analyzed during 
simulation is voice packet end-to-end (E2E) delay. E2E delay 
refers to the average time required the voice packet to be 
transmitted from the client node to the server. This time is 
critical, because higher E2E delay will mean higher voice 
distortion.  In the situation when any of previously described 
attacks is performed, due to AP flooding the queue is a 
constantly large. Reason for high E2E delay can be more 
broken links and frequent re-routing during the transmission 
of the data packet. 
 The delay in the network must not exceed the threshold 
value of 80ms to maintain the minimum number of VoIP 
calls with acceptable quality, which is not situation when the 
network is under attack. Figure 9 is showing E2E delay 
statistics of the wireless network. 
 We have again the same situation – decreasing of the E2E 
delay with the simulation run time when attack is conducted 
by three attackers and slightly increasing of this metric when 
attack by one attacker with larger packet size is conducted. 
 
Figure 9. Voice Packet End to End Delay for different 
number of attackers and different ping packet size 
5.    Proposed mitigation techniques against 
ICMP Ping Flood Attack effects 
 
There are several methods to mitigate the effects of this type 
of attack.  
The simplest way of protection from this attack is 
complete blocking of the ICMP Ping packets, but on the 
other site this will be very radical solution and there will be 
problems with servers. If some problem come up it will be 
difficult to be diagnosed. 
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 For example, in Linux, all ICMP packets can be blocked 
as follows:  
     iptables –p icmp -j DROP 
 
 However, not all ICMP packets at the firewall should be 
indiscriminately blocked. Better solution is blocking certain 
types of packets; otherwise, network performance could 
suffer. Candidates for blocking are timestamp request and 
reply, information request and reply, address mask request 
and reply, and redirect [12]. 
 Other solution is limiting the maximum number or the 
maximum size of ICMP packets using appropriate threshold. 
If registered ICMP traffic is greater than the traffic 
determined by threshold, it will be dropped. 
ROUTER(CONFIG)# ACCESS-LIST 131 PERMIT 
ICMP ANY ANY ECHO 
ROUTER(CONFIG)# ACCESS-LIST 131 PERMIT 
ICMP ANY ANY ECHO-REPLY 
ROUTER(CONFIG)# INTERFACE ETH0/0 
ROUTER(CONFIG-IF)# RATE-LIMIT OUTPUT 
ACCESS-GROUP 131 
16000 8000 8000 CONFORM-ACTION CONTINUE 
EXCEED-ACTION DROP 
 In previous example, any ICMP ECHO or ECHO REPLY 
traffic will be allowed until it exceeds 16000 Bytes, at which 
point it will be dropped. 
 Also very effective method for reducing the effects of this 
attack is limiting the speed or frequency of sending ICMP 
packets from single user (source). 
 In the previous solutions it is important to determine 
acceptable value of this threshold. It is important this 
threshold not to be too low, because if certain ICMP packets 
are used to “keep-alive” or monitoring the status of a device, 
low threshold would be a reason the prevention from ICMP 
Ping flood attack to cause other major problems within the 
network. 
 Using OPNET Modeler simulation tool we conducted 
analysis of several methods to mitigate this type of DoS 
attack, for the case when the WLAN is attacked by one 
malicious node using Ping Flood attack with Ping size of 
22000 bytes. 
 Filtering ICMP ECHO REPLY messages resulted in high 
improvement of the QoS characteristics.  
 We also considered behavior of different types of firewalls 
under ICMP Ping Flood attack. The following types of 
firewall were considered: 
• CS PIX 525 8ae adv (CISCO), 
• CKP Window Firewall 4e adv, 
• CKP Unix Firewall 4e adv. 
 The Cisco Firewall gave far the best results. The results 
we got using Windows and Unix Firewalls was also 
improved but not as the improvement we got using specified 
Cisco firewall. The improvement we got using Windows and 
Unix Firewalls were almost the same. 
 The comparison between Reno and New Reno fast 
recovery mechanisms during conducted attack also gave a 
big difference on QoS Parameters. Namely, using of New 
Reno mechanism as a TCP parameter within wireless 
network when ICMP Ping Flood attack is conducted is giving 
much better effects than the case when we used Reno fast 
recovery mechanism. 
 
  5.1 Proposed Failure Recovery mechanism against 
ICMP Ping Flood Attack 
Taking in consideration the same situation (ICMP Ping Flood 
Attack by one malicious node with ping packet size of 22000 
bytes) we are using Link Failure/Recovery mechanism to 
show its effect on mitigation of this type of attack. The link is 
recovered during period of 500 to 900 seconds. For better 
preview, all graphs are showing not the average results as in 
previous simulation results, but the “as is” results generated 
from OPNET. 
  
Figure 10. Packets retransmission attempts decreased using 
proposed Failure/Recovery mechanism 
 




International Journal of Communication Networks and Information Security (IJCNIS)                                              Vol. 3, No. 1, April 2011 
 
 The general goal of failure recovery mechanism is to 
extend the network lifetime by restarting or reprogramming 
failed or misbehaving links. In combination, these two 
measures raise the cost for a potential attacker. Even if an 
attacker manages to capture a node and abuses it for his own 
purposes, there is a chance that the aberrant behavior of this 
node will be detected and the link be recovered, thus 
nullifying the attack [13]. 
 A good failure recovery mechanism can improve the 
efficiency and mitigate the DoS vulnerabilities [14]. 
 Figure 10 shows attacked network behavior when 
failure/recovery mechanism is used. It can be seen that from 
the period of 500 to 900 seconds when failures are recovered 
the number of retransmissions attempts is going down. 
 This will cause the number of collisions to be reduced, so 
during the same period WLAN delay will be drastically 
reduced (Figure 11). In this period WLAN Delay will be 
slightly higher than it is in situation when there is no attack. 
 By analyzing voice traffic we got similar results which are 
shown in Figure 13. Namely, jitter caracteristics during this 
period of link failure recovery of 500 to 900 seconds are 
slightly higher than they were in case when there is not ICMP 
Ping Flood Attack  
 
Figure 12. Data Dropped decreased using proposed 
Failure/Recovery mechanism 
 
Figure 13. Voice Jitter decreased using proposed 
Failure/Recovery mechanism 
   The situation with voice packet end to end delay is the 
same. End to end characteristics for the period when failure 
recovery mechanism is used is decreased (Figure 14). 
 
  
Figure 14. Voice Packet End to End Delay decreased using 
proposed Failure/Recovery mechanism 
 As we already explained, the delay in the network during 
the period of voice transmission must not exceed the 
threshold value of 80ms to maintain the minimum number of 
VoIP calls with acceptable quality, which is not situation 
when the network is under attack and Link Failure/Recovery 
mechanism is used. 
6.  Conclusion 
In our paper, the effects of the ICMP Ping Flood Attack on 
the wireless network were explored. More specific, behavior 
of the wireless networks under attack of different number of 
attackers and different ping packets size is examined. With 
the in-depth simulation, we found that the wireless networks 
QoS parameters can be dramatically reduced under this type 
of flooding attack. Also, increased number of attackers and 
packet size has different effect at different WLAN QoS 
Parameters. Several defence mechanisms against this type of 
attack were analyzed. In the last section appropriate Link 
Failure/Recovery Mechanism is proposed and behavior of the 
attacked wireless network and improvement of QoS 
parameters under this proposal is shown. During our work we 
also simulated the same scenarios when appropriate firewall, 
fast recovery (New Reno) or filtering of specific ICMP 
ECHO messages is used. In all this situations we got 
improved results. In the future work, we intend to continue 
with exploration of possibility for setting optimal threshold 
for Failure/Recovery mechanism which will activate this 
mechanism when large number of packets or large sized 
ICMP packets is received.  
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